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The paper develops a model of educational choices with uncertainty to account for the
high drop out rate in countries with open admission policies at university entry. As long
as university entry reveals useful information, students have incentives to enroll, update
their beliefs and choose whether to continue university or drop out.
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Students' performance in tertiary education differs considerably across European OECD
countries. The first column of table 1 shows that the percentage of youths that enrols in
tertiary education ranges from 32 to 72 percent.
2 However, as the second column of the
table indicates, the enrolment does not necessarily nor always leads to proportionally
successful graduations.
3 The degree of successful graduation rate depends on the survival
rate in university, i.e., the fraction of students completing their studies, displayed in
column 3. On average, 67 percent of students in OECD countries complete their studies.
However, survival rates feature considerable variation across countries. While 83 percent
of those starting university in United Kingdom manage to complete their degrees, only 42
percent of students in Italy complete their studies. The complement of survival rates is
the drop out rate, which ranges from 15 to 17 percent in Ireland and United Kingdom to
58 and 41 in Italy and France.
What does explain this variation? Most available research on drop out emphasizes the
role of abilities and credit constraints (Altonji, 1993; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999;
Arcidiacono, 2004; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2008), on the one hand, and labour market outcomes' uncertainty, on the other hand
(Groot and Oosterbeek, 1992; Becker, 2006), without mentioning cross countries
differences in universities' admission policies. This paper presents a simple model of
educational choices with uncertainty on the non monetary cost of schooling, whose
information is disclosed during university attendance. Individuals observe the signals and
choose whether to continue university or drop out. The conjecture is that open
universities admission policies, along with low tuition fees, induce young people to
experiment with academic studies.
2Entry rates are expressed as net entry rates, which represent the proportion of people of a
synthetic age-cohort who enter the tertiary level of education, irrespective of changes in
the population sizes and of differences between OECD countries in the typical entry age.
3Graduation rates are computed as the ratio of tertiary graduates to the population at the
typical age of graduation.Policies for access to higher education differ markedly among European countries
(Jallade, 1992). In some countries, such as Austria, France
4 and Italy, the diploma gives
students a legal right to study in any field in the university sector without universities
screening them. In some countries (Germany, Italy and Austria since 2005) admission in
a few courses (generally Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy) in which the total number of
applicants exceeds the number of places available is awarded on the basis of a general
selection procedure. In Spain, 70 percent of universities set up a specific examination for
admission, whose mark, combined with those obtained in high schools, are used to
allocate students to the most selective universities. The others have open admission
policies. In Finland all fields of study have restricted entry ("numerus clausus") and
universities use a combination of grades and examination tests to select students. In
United Kingdom universities apply a rigorous selective process and allocate students
among institutions according to their marks; the system is centrally organized in Ireland.









Austria 34 17 59
Denmark 44 39 69
Finland 72 41 75
France 37 25 59
Germany 32 19 70
Ireland 38 29 85
Italy 44 20 42
Spain 48 32 77
United Kingdom 45 37 83
Coutry mean 44 29 69
Source: OECD, Type A education
4Very rigorous selection by competitive examinations takes place to enter the Grandes
Ecoles sector.A schooling model with uncertainty
This is a standard human capital model for the choice of acquiring higher education with
uncertainty over the cost of schooling. Individuals decide whether to enter university
(s=1), thus facing an unknown outcome, or access the labour market (s=0), benefiting a
known wage
5. The individual's problem, then, is essentially a two armed bandit problem.
One arm represents the unskilled level wage and has a known deterministic value. The
second arm represents the outcome from university entry and has a stochastic output.
Individuals seek to learn the true distribution by experimenting with the second arm and
observing the outcome.
The structure of the decision process is the following. The individual chooses whether to
enter in university ( s=1 ) or not (s=0). If she does not enrol, she benefits a safe labour
market payoff that always entails w. If she enrols, at the end of the second period she
receives a signal which is correlated with the true cost of human capital acquisition,
updates her beliefs over the cost of schooling and decides whether to continue university
or abandon it. If university is completed, the individual earns a skilled wage, βw with
β>1 in period three. The wage is discounted by a factor δ<1. Choices are made by
comparing costs and benefits from each action and by choosing the one that maximizes
individual utility.
There is a continuum of young people, which differ in their ability level θj. This variable
is assumed perfectly observable. Schooling acquisition is composed by a risky non
monetary cost of education e, specified in such a way that the non pecuniary cost of
acquiring education is lower for abler individuals. His value is ex ante unknown. For
simplicity e can assume only two values e є {eL, eH}, where eL indicates a low cost of
passing exams, whilst eH a high cost. Individuals have prior beliefs over e. Specifically,
assume that before enrolling the cost of education is eL with p = 0.5 and eH with
5The assumption of a known wage is far from being realistic, as especially in continental
European countries individuals experience high uncertainty on the labour market as well.
However, for simplicity, I abstract from the possibility that also labour market returns are
risky.probability 1-p. Normalizing eH = γeL with γ > 1, denote eL = e Beliefs about e change
as a function of an observed signal g є {L, H} which is correlated with the true cost of
human capital acquisition. The individual observes the signal g after university
enrolment. It might indicate the number of passed exams at the end of the second
academic year and/or the mark awarded if the exam has been successfully passed. Let the
signal be informative, meaning that it is more likely that it takes a high value (g=H) for a
type with a low cost of education and a low one (g=L) for an individual with a higher
cost. These two assumptions imply that information gained at university reduces the
noise about the own cost of investment. More formally, assume that:
Equation 1 and 2:
q H g e P L   ) | (
q L g e P H   ) | (
With 1 5 . 0   q As the set of possible outcomes g contains only two elements {L, H},
the Bayesian updating rule is straightforward. The individual possible posteriors are
P(eH|g = H)=q and P(eL|g = L)=1-q. The payoff functions of individual j at time t are
defined as follows:
Equations 3:
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The game is solved backward, starting with the decision taken in the last period. Suppose
that the signal received is g = H. Once known the signal, the expected utility of the
individual from staying in university, conditional on g = H, is expressed by Equation(utility c . Utility from dropping, conditional on g = H, is w. The individual terminates




















All those with observable ability higher than θ
*
j remain in university. The threshold is
increasing in the cost of schooling acquisition (e) and decreasing in the labour market
premium associated with university completion (β). An increase in the quality of the
information received (q) reduces the threshold above which students continue university
conditional on having observed a high signal.
Now suppose that the individual receives a signal g = L, the utility changes according to
Equation (Equation 3d), whilst the utility derived from drop out stays constant at w.





















This threshold is increasing in the cost of schooling and decreasing in the benefit. In this
case, better quality of the information increases the threshold as the more precise is the
signal, the lower the ability level below which individuals prefer to drop out having
received a low signal. The ability of those who receive a high signal is higher than the
ability of those who receive a low signal if the signal is positively correlated with the true
non monetary cost of schooling; otherwise, the opposite holds.
In the first period, the individual enrols in university if the expected utility gained from
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The result indicates that when q ≠ 0.5, entering university is always a preferable choice as
it reveals useful information if the sign of the correlation between the signal and the true
cost of schooling acquisition is ex ante known. If on the contrary q = 0.5, then the
expected utility before entering equals the expected utility one year after enrolment and
no advantages are gained from enrolling in university. The actions undertaken can be
summarized as follows:



































The model allows for the possibility that someone might receive a low signal but still
remain in the schooling system. The result shows that individuals can be ranked along
their observable ability dimension so that those who terminate university are more
talented then those who received a low signal and drop out university. A schooling model
with perfect information is not able to account for the fact that some students might drop
out from university. As a partial human capital accumulation is not compensated by the
prospect of future gains, there are no incentives to enter university without obtaining the
degree.
Conclusion
The model is able to rationalize the stylized facts depicted in Section intro, by showing
that if students have uncertainty on their ability of schooling acquisition, they might find
it optimal to enter university. As long as university enrolment reveals useful information
otherwise unknown experimentation is optimal because the ex ante expected returns are
higher than the costs. Predictions are coherent with the fact that countries with openuniversity admission policies (Austria, France and Italy) feature higher drop out rates
than countries where universities apply selective admission procedures (Finland, United
Kingdom and Ireland). This argument does not undermine the role of youth
unemployment on higher educational choices (Becker, 2006; Bertola, 2007), but
complements it highlighting the important role of admission policy. Policies which
provide students with better information about their prospects for completing schooling
would affect the ex ante probability of success, thereby reducing drop out.
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